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between 1990 and 2003. Yet the impact of these agreements is largely unknown. In this paper, we 
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preferential tariff liberalization has not considerably increased Uganda’s trade with member countries, 
on average across sectors. The effect, however, is heterogeneous across sectors. Finally, we find no 
evidence of trade-diversion effects.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) between low-income countries, South-
South trade agreements, has increased dramatically in the last decade: low-income countries 
signed 70 new agreements between 1990 and 2003 (WTO 2003). In the same period, regional 
agreements between countries of all income levels have spread worldwide
3. Still, South-
South arrangements account for more than 50 percent of all new trade agreements. Important 
examples include MERCOSUR in South America and COMESA in Eastern and Southern 
Africa. Arrangements are common between countries that are both poor and small; there are 
more than 30 arrangements in Africa (Yang and Gupta, 2005). Countries frequently belong to 
more than one agreement resulting in competing demands.  
 
At the same time, South-South PTAs between small countries may not yield substantial 
economic gains to their members. South-South PTAs are more likely to give rise to trade 
diversion rather than trade creation. Pro-competitive effects for local firms, due to greater 
competition, and dynamic efficiency gains linked to economies of scale are also unlikely, as 
partner countries are usually both poor and small. In addition, fiscal revenues in low-income 
countries are more vulnerable to trade reforms (see section III). 
 
Empirical evidence of trade effects in South-South PTAs is mixed (see section II). Papers in 
this literature, in general, use country-level data and capture the impact of preferential trade 
agreements by introducing a PTA dummy variable in a gravity-model framework. The 
dummy variable, however, is endogenous since the decision to create or join an agreement is 
not random. In addition, aggregate data masks commodity-level heterogeneity that may also 
bias the estimates. Progress from a methodological point of view has been made in the 
literature by Clausing (2001) and Romalis (2005) who use commodity-level data to analyze 
NAFTA and CUSFTA. We are the first ones in the literature to apply their empirical strategy 
to a South-South trade agreement, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA). In particular, in our analysis we focus on the static effects of South-South 
preferential trade agreements that take place through changes in trade patterns. We exploit 
the variation in the data across commodities, origin countries, and time to estimate the impact 
of COMESA preferential trade liberalization on Uganda’s imports between 1994 and 2003. 
We also investigate whether these changes are driven by trade creation or trade diversion. 
 
We focus our analysis on COMESA as it is a good example of a South-South preferential 
trade agreement involving small economies. All member countries are truly small in the 
world economy and the agreement has been in effect since 1994. Within COMESA, we 
analyze the impact of preferential liberalization on Uganda’s trade patterns as Uganda 
represents a relatively stable economy in this time period. 
 
                                                 
3 According to WTO (2003), 133 new agreements were signed between 1990 and 2003.   - 4 - 
Using a difference-in-difference estimation strategy, our results show that reductions in the 
preferential tariff rate applied by Uganda to COMESA member countries, between 1994 and 
2003, did not considerably increase imports from such countries. In other words, consumers 
in Uganda have been reluctant – on average across sectors - to switch the origin of their 
purchases to COMESA countries following the COMESA agreement. 
  
We find that the elasticity of imports with respect to tariff rates is between 14% and 16%. We 
also estimate that the elasticity of substitution between varieties of the same good from 
different origin countries is approximately equal to 1.7. The magnitude of these effects is 
relatively small, compared to the results from previous studies for the United States and 
Canada within the CUSFTA and NAFTA agreements (Clausing 2001, Romalis 2005). 
Romalis’s (2005) estimate for Mexican imports, however, is closer to our own estimate for 
Uganda. This may suggest that consumers in low-income countries, in general, have more 
inelastic demand curves and are, therefore, less likely to immediately benefit from trade 
reform. Search costs may help explain the reluctance of low-income consumers to switch the 
origin of their purchases. 
 
Another interpretation of our results is consistent with the most important criticism of South-
South PTAs, that is, because member countries in this type of agreements are not natural 
trading partners, preferential tariff liberalization is unlikely to produce a substantial and 
welfare-improving (that is, not trade-diverting) increase in trade volumes. This interpretation 
is supported by the finding that the effect of COMESA on Uganda's imports is heterogeneous 
across sectors. We find that the industries where the impact is larger and significant are those 
where developing countries are more likely to have a comparative advantage.  
 
We test the robustness of our elasticity estimates in a number of ways. One concern is that 
the reduction in tariff rates within COMESA might have been compensated by an increase of 
non-tariff barriers on the same commodities. For example, after the initial implementation of 
COMESA, ad valorem excise taxes were imposed in Uganda on selected imports and goods 
targeted for these taxes tended to be produced predominantly in COMESA countries. We 
think that this reading of our results is unlikely given that we partially account for the 
existence of non-tariff barriers by using data on import excise taxes. Political economy 
factors are also unlikely to affect our results as, in our main specification, we control for both 
time-invariant political-economy factors and changes over time of political-economy factors 
that are common across member and non-member countries. In addition, our findings are not 
overturned by a triple-difference estimation strategy that controls for the impact of factors 
that change over time and are specific for each origin country of imports (this robustness 
check follows Romalis (2005)). Finally, our results are strengthened when we consider the 
possible impact of tax evasion on recorded imports, as documented by Fisman and Wei 
(2001).
4  
                                                 
4 One reason why recorded imports are low when tariffs are high is tax evasion. When tariffs come down, the 
increase in imports might therefore reflect in part an increase in recorded (as opposed to actual) imports due to 
less tax evasion.   - 5 - 
 
Finally, the concluding step of the empirical analysis consists in the investigation of trade-
creation vs. trade-diversion effects. We find no support for trade-diversion effects given that 
there is no evidence of a reduction of imports from non-COMESA countries. Therefore, 
although COMESA’s preferential tariff liberalization has not considerably increased 
Uganda’s trade with member countries, these small effects are likely to be associated with 
trade creation. In addition, it is important to notice that even small changes might represent a 
big improvement for the type of country we are analyzing, a low-income and small country 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows: section two surveys the literature, section 
three reviews the theory, section four discusses the data and the specifics of the trade 
agreement; section five develops the empirical strategy and presents the results; and section 
six concludes. 
 
II.   LITERATURE 
Empirical work on preferential trade agreements is extensive. In general, these studies are 
either ex-ante computable-general-equilibrium (CGE) studies (see Baldwin and Venables 
1995 for a survey) or ex-post empirical studies. The ex-post analyses can be further divided 
between papers based on aggregate-level data and works using sector-level or commodity-
level data. 
 
The ex-post studies based on country-level data capture the impact of preferential trade 
agreements by introducing a PTA dummy variable in a gravity-model framework (e.g., 
Frankel and Wei 1995)
5. While these papers generally find a positive impact of preferential 
agreements on trade volumes, the estimated effect is likely to be biased due to endogeneity 
and reverse causality. The main reason is that the decision to create or join an agreement is 
usually not random, as countries signing trade arrangements with each other are a selected 
group. Among other factors, high trade volumes increase the likelihood that countries will 
make an agreement. To address this concern, more recently Chris Magee (2003) models the 
PTA dummy variable as endogenous in a gravity-type equation. He finds evidence that, once 
endogeneity is taken into account, the impact on trade patterns of preferential trade 
agreements is unstable across different specifications and, in particular, not always positive. 
 
Previous works on South-South PTAs and, specifically, on African PTAs often follow the 
pre-Magee (2003) gravity-type approach and, therefore, are possibly affected by the same 
type of concerns (for example, Cernat 2001, Subramanian and Tamirisa 2001). Cernat (2001) 
asks whether South-South regional PTAs are more trade-diverting than other agreements and 
                                                 
5 The empirical approach of this early literature was of course limited by the fact that, at the time these papers 
were written, commodity-level data was not easily accessible.   - 6 - 
finds a negative answer.
6 In particular, the paper shows that COMESA has produced net 
trade-creation effects with no evidence of trade diversion. On the other hand, Subramanian 
and Tamirisa (2001) offer a more pessimistic view: Their results reveal a negative block 
effect for COMESA countries prior to the formation of the agreement. In 1990 countries 
within COMESA traded significantly less with each other than the average pair of countries 
in the sample. This finding suggests that COMESA countries are not natural trading partners, 
therefore the agreement is more likely to lead to trade diversion.
7 
 
The second subset of ex-post studies attempts to overcome the empirical problems of gravity-
type analyses by employing sector-level and commodity-level trade data (Clausing 2001, 
Krueger 1999, 2000, Romalis 2005, Yeats 1998a, 1998b). In particular, using detailed 
commodity-level data, Clausing (2001) estimates the effect of CUSFTA on trade flows from 
Canada to the United States. Her results suggest that the agreement has not been trade 
diverting. Romalis (2005), in contrast, finds evidence of trade-diversion effects in his 
analysis of the impact of NAFTA and CUSFTA on member countries’ imports. Using a 
triple-difference estimation technique
8, Romalis (2005) also estimates demand elasticities 
and finds that U.S. and Canada trade volumes are very sensitive to tariff movements. The 
estimates for Mexico, in contrast, are lower in absolute value, consistent with our findings for 
Uganda. In addition, based on estimated elasticities of total export supply, the paper finds 
evidence of a modest effect of NAFTA and CUSFTA on border prices and welfare. 
 
From a methodological point of view, our paper is most closely related to Clausing (2001) 
and Romalis (2005). In particular we are the first ones in the literature, to our knowledge, to 
apply their empirical strategy to a South-South trade agreement. Finally, our paper is also 
closely related to recent works in the literature estimating import demand elasticities (Kee, 
Nicita and Olarreaga 2005) and elasticities of substitution (Broda and Weinstein 2004). 
 
 
III.   TRADE CREATION AND  TRADE DIVERSION 
The welfare impact of PTAs is ambiguous. As first stated by Viner (1950), preferential trade 
liberalization can either result in the replacement of inefficient, high-cost domestic 
production with low-cost imports from member countries (i.e., trade creation) or in the 
substitution of efficient, low-cost imports from non-member countries with less efficient 
imports from member countries (i.e., trade diversion). Consider the case of small open 
economies signing an agreement: If trade creation takes place, PTAs are welfare-improving 
while, under trade diversion, their effect on welfare through changes in trade patterns is 
                                                 
6 In order to differentiate between trade creation and trade diversion, Cernat (2001) introduces two dummy 
variables which capture, respectively, whether two countries belong to the same PTA and whether one belongs 
to a PTA and the other does not. 
7 Other studies using aggregate data to analyze African trade patterns are Foroutan and Pritchett (1993), Coe 
and Hoffmaister (1999), Rodrik (1999), IMF (2000). 
8 This triple-difference estimation strategy is equivalent to what we use in the last column of Table 7.   - 7 - 
ambiguous.
9 In the case of large open economies, the impact of PTAs is complicated by 
terms-of-trade changes, which make it harder to sign the net welfare effect. However, our 
focus on COMESA, whose member countries are small open economies
10, allows us to 
abstract from terms-of-trade changes.
11 
 
The difference between trade creation and trade diversion is also relevant from a political-
economy point of view. Under trade creation, preferential trade agreements are more likely to 
be building blocks for multilateral trade negotiations, since policymakers can build consensus 
around the visible gains of partial trade liberalization. Stumbling-blocks effects are instead 
possible in industries characterized by trade diversion, where new special-interest groups will 
form and lobby against multilateral free trade. These are sectors where exports by PTA 
member countries have replaced exports by more efficient non-member countries. In such 
industries, producers from member countries would lose in direct competition with producers 
from non-member countries, and thus feel threatened by movements towards global free 
trade (Krishna 1998, Krueger 1999). 
 
The welfare effects taking place through trade creation and trade diversion and other 
channels imply that South-South PTAs between small countries are the least likely to 
produce gains for their members, for several reasons. First, developing countries are not 
usually natural trading partners, as evidenced by the fact that they trade little with each other 
as a share of total imports.
12 For example, the share of African imports from other African 
countries in 2001 was approximately 9 percent (IMF 2002). The reason is that low-income 
countries tend to have similar relative factors supplies, therefore the incentive to trade with 
each other is smaller than for dissimilar countries. In other words, developing countries are 
not low-cost producers of most goods other developing countries import, since they all tend 
to have a comparative advantage in the same sectors.
 Therefore, South-South trade 
agreements are likely to lead to trade diversion as opposed to trade creation, if any increase 
in imports occurs at all. From a political-economy point of view, trade diversion in turn 
implies a stumbling-block effect of South-South trade agreements for multilateral trade 
liberalization.  
 
                                                 
9 The case of trade diversion of preferential tariff liberalization for a small open economy (SOE) is, in welfare 
terms, very similar to the case of non-discriminatory tariff liberalization for a large open economy (LOE). In 
both situations the net welfare effect is ambiguous due to the change of border prices faced by the country. 
However, in the PTA SOE case with trade diversion, the change of border prices is due to the discriminatory 
nature of the PTA while, in the LOE case of non-discriminatory trade liberalization, the change of border prices 
is driven by a terms-of-trade effect. 
10 Given the small-open-economy assumption, that is infinite export supply elasticity, shifts in Uganda’s import 
demand caused by preferential trade liberalization do not affect border prices. 
11 Additional welfare effects - besides the static effects of PTAs through changes in trade patterns - include the 
impact of PTAs on imperfectly-competitive markets and their dynamic effects. See Baldwin and Venables 
(1995) for a complete survey. In this paper, we only focus on the static effects of PTAs that take place through 
changes in trade patterns. 
12 On the other hand, low trade volumes between developing countries may be due to high trade barriers 
between them.   - 8 - 
Second, low-income and small PTA partner countries are also less likely to produce 
efficiency gains - linked to economies of scale - and to trigger pro-competitive effects for 
local producers. The reason is that South-South PTAs offer their members access to smaller 
markets than would be the case in North-South agreements. In addition, firms in PTA partner 
countries which are developing economies may not be much more efficient than home firms, 
therefore competitive pressure on domestic producers may not be so strong. Finally, because 
trade taxes are a large proportion of domestic revenues in developing countries, the loss of 
tariff revenue may have a more adverse impact on a developing country’s fiscal position, 
This possibility is evidenced by the strong decline in tariff revenue (8 percent of GDP) in 
Uganda after the inception of COMESA (Figure 1). For these and other reasons, some 
authors in the literature have expressed their preference, from an economic point of view, for 
North-South over South-South PTAs (Schiff 1997, Schiff and Winters 2003).
13  
 
IV.   DATA 
We use commodity-level import and tariff data at the 6-digit Harmonized System level. 
Import statistics by origin country come from the COMTRADE database, developed by the 
United Nations Statistics Division. Data on preferential and MFN (customs-duty) tariff rates, 
in addition to import excise taxes, are obtained from TRAINS, developed by UNCTAD. We 
access both data sets through the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) system, designed 
by the World Bank. 
 
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is an example of South-
South PTA involving small economies. The treaty establishing COMESA as a preferential 
trade agreement of Eastern and Southern African states was ratified on December 8, 1994.
14 
At that date, some of the countries in COMESA - including Uganda - were already part of a 
regional trade agreement called PTA.
15 The data available for Uganda, used in this paper, 
covers the last year of the PTA agreement (1994) and four recent years of the COMESA 
agreement (from 2000 to 2003). For each of these five years, we merge numbers on the value 
of Uganda's imports, at the commodity level and by country of origin, with data on Uganda's 
PTA tariff rates (for 1994), COMESA tariff rates (for 2000 to 2003) and MFN tariff rates 
(for all years). We also use data on Uganda's import excise taxes. 
                                                 
13 “One of the main themes of this book is our preference for North-South over South-South RIAs for 
developing countries. If a developing country is going to pursue regionalism, it will almost always do better to 
sign up with a large rich country than with a small poor one. In trade terms, a large rich country is likely to be a 
more efficient supplier of most goods and a source of greater competition for local producers.” (Schiff and 
Winters, 2003, p.15). 
14 Member countries of COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) are: Angola, Burundi, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt (which joined in 1998), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles (which joined in 1997), Sudan, Swaziland, 
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In terms of population, this agreement is extensive as the overall population 
of COMESA countries was, in 1998, approximately 380 million people. 
15 Member countries of the PTA, which was ratified in 1982, were: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe (all of which were also part of the 
later COMESA); and Somalia and Lesotho.   - 9 - 
 
Uganda's data for these five years is coded according to three different versions of the 
Harmonized System (HS) classification (H0 for 1994, H1 for 2000 and 2001, H2 for 2002 
and 2003). We use WITS's concordance tables and recode all the data following the H0 
classification.
16 In addition, tariff data according to the HS classification is presented up to 
the 8 digit level, while import values are disaggregated only up to the 6 digit level. We use 
the simple average tariff rate for each 6-digit level code (averaged over the 7-digit and 8-digit 
codes).
17 Finally, the tariff rates we use in the empirical analysis incorporate information on 
import excise taxes imposed on each product. 
 
Tables 1 through 4 present summary statistics of the main variables used in the Uganda’s 
analysis. They document the extent and patterns of preferential and MFN tariff liberalization 
taking place in Uganda between 1994 and 2003. They also offer a preliminary view of the 
impact of trade liberalization (preferential and not) on Uganda's imports. 
 
Table 1 shows that tariff rates faced by COMESA countries decrease substantially in this 
period, going from an average preferential tariff rate (across tariff lines) of  11.3 percentage 
points in 1994 to an average of 5.5 percentage points in 2003. This reduction in protection 
vis-à-vis COMESA countries is matched by a substantial increase in the average value of 
imports of a 6-digit HS commodity from the same countries (US$155 thousand to US$289 
thousand). Table 2 shows that MFN tariff rates decrease as well between 1994 and 2003, 
even more than preferential tariff rates (from 17.9 to 10.2 percentage points) but their level 
on average is higher than preferential tariff rates, both in 1994 and 2003. Imports from non-
COMESA countries increase as well during this period of time. The overall evidence on 
changes in imports, from both COMESA and non-COMESA countries, is consistent with the 
pattern of total imports (percent of GDP) in Figure 1. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 provide evidence on the shifting distribution of tariff rates (both preferential 
and MFN ones) between 1994 and 2003. The mode of the distribution of preferential tariff 
rates is in 1994 between 5 and 10 per cent, while in 2003 it is under 5 per cent. On the other 
hand, the mode of the distribution of MFN tariff rates (between 5 and 10 per cent) does not 
change from 1994 to 2003. 
 
Finally, appendices I and II show respectively preferential and MFN tariff rates in 1994 and 
2003 by 2-digit 1996 HS codes. The sectors that experienced the greatest reduction in 
                                                 
16 Going from the H2 and H1 to the  H0 classification, a few different H2 codes and H1 codes are reclassified as 
the same H0 code. In those cases, for each H0 code we use the simple average of the tariff rates (averaged over 
the overlapping H2 or H1 codes).  
17 Another complication is that, in the period considered, Uganda belonged to other preferential trade 
agreements (the CBI – Cross-Border Initiative – and EAC – East African Community). We do not have data on 
preferential tariff rates within these other agreements. Our results hold to the extent that the rates applied by 
Uganda to COMESA countries belonging to these other PTAs were the COMESA tariff rates. This is consistent 
with our understanding of these arrangements (IMF 2000, McIntyre 2005).   - 10 - 
preferential tariff rates between 1994 and 2003 were “edible fruit and nuts...,” “vegetable 
plaiting materials...,” “essential oils, etc.; perfumery, cosmetic...,” “prep feathers, down 
etc..,” and “musical instruments...”  Some sectors, such as “tobacco and manufactured 
tobacco substitutes,” experienced an increase in the preferential tariff rate due to the 
imposition of import excise taxes that generally targeted goods from COMESA countries. 
Appendix III shows Uganda's total imports by country of origin, in 1994 and 2003 
(calculated based on data at the commodity level). Kenya is the largest exporter to Uganda in 
both years. Imports from other COMESA countries are substantially smaller. 
 
In our empirical analysis, following the previous literature, we ask the following questions: 
To what extent did Uganda's imports from COMESA countries increase, between 1994 and 
2003, as a result of COMESA preferential trade liberalization? To the extent that imports did 
increase, how much of this increase was a result of trade diversion? (evidenced by a 
reduction in imports from non-COMESA countries). In asking both questions, we cannot 
simply consider the change in imports from COMESA and non-COMESA countries between 
1994 and 2003. We need to construct a counterfactual of how much trade would have 
changed in the absence of the trade agreement and net out this effect from our measure. This 
is the goal of the model in the next section. 
 
V.   EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND RESULTS 
In this section we exploit the time, commodity and origin-country variation in imports and 
tariffs to identify COMESA’s impact on Uganda’s imports. We first develop a simple model 
that delivers the estimating equations of our empirical analysis. Our methodology is closely 
related to the one used by Clausing (2001) and Romalis (2005). We proceed from the 
simplest to the most sophisticated estimation strategy, reflecting the successive advances in 
the literature. 
 
We assume that each commodity i is differentiated by country of origin c (Armington 
assumption).
18 Varieties from different origins of the same good are not perfect substitutes; 
the impact of preferential trade liberalization on trade patterns is captured by the elasticity of 
substitution between varieties of different origins. The representative consumer in Uganda 
maximizes the following Cobb-Douglas utility function (at time t) over aggregate 
consumption of each commodity i,  it Q , subject to total expenditure being less or equal to 
total income  t Y : 
 
  ∑ =
i
it i t Q b U lg , where  ∑ =
i
i b 1.                  (1) 
 
Consider a constant elasticity-of-substitution (CES) demand structure over varieties of 
commodity i coming from each country c at time t: 
                                                 
18 We use the terms commodity, product, and good interchangably in the paper.   - 11 - 
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where  ict q  is the quantity demanded in Uganda of commodity i from country c at time t, 
and  i σ  is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of commodity i. The 
optimal demand for each variety is found through maximization of aggregate consumption 
it Q  subject to the following budget constraint: 
 
  ∑ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
c
it ict ict ict ict E g t p q ,                              (3) 
 
where  i ict ict ict a p p σ , ( = ) equals the border price of variety c of commodity i at time t, 
ict a  equals the marginal cost to produce commodity i in country c at time t,  ict t  is one plus 
the ad valorem tariff rate applied by Uganda at time t on variety c, and  1 ≥ ict g  represents 
iceberg transport costs (i.e., in order to have one unit of variety c of good i at time t, it is 
necessary to buy  ict g  units), and  t i it Y b E ⋅ =  gives the total expenditure at time t on 
commodity i (this follows from (5)).  In what follows, we will assume that the elasticity of 
substitution is equal across commodities ( i i every  for    , σ σ = ).
19 Maximization of (2) subject 
to (3) results in the following quantity demanded in Uganda of variety c relative to variety 
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which gives a CIF value (Cost including Insurance and Freight) of: 
 
                                                 
19 In the empirical analysis, we first estimate a common elasticity of substitution across commodities. We next 
estimate elasticities of substitution which are specific for each one-digit HS sector (see Section V.C)..   - 12 - 
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ict ict ict it t g p P ) 1 (
1
) 1 ( ] ) ( [ σ σ  is the price index of good i at time t. Taking 
logarithms of expression (6), we can derive the first specification of the empirical model: 
 
  it it ict ict ict ict E P g p t m lg lg ) 1 ( lg ) 1 ( lg ) 1 ( lg lg + − − − + − + − = σ σ σ σ              (7) 
 
Expression (7) is the starting point of our empirical analysis. Throughout, we use pooled 
yearly data for 1994 and 2000-2003, and measure the first term on the right hand side in 
expression (7) using two methods. In Table 5, we use the log of (one plus) the preferential 
tariff rate as directly implied by (7).
 20 In Table 6, we use  ) 1 ( − ict t , which is the ad-valorem 
tariff rate applied by Uganda to commodity i from country c at time t (taking a first-order 
Taylor approximation,  ) 1 ( lg − ≅ ict ict t t ). While the coefficient on the first measure represents 
the impact of a percentage change of (one plus) the tariff rate, the coefficient on the second 
measure gives the impact of a percentage point change. Each column in the two tables 
labelled by the same number corresponds to the same specification.  
 
A.   Benchmark Estimators 
The first step in our empirical strategy is to estimate naïve benchmark regressions meant to 
demonstrate that omitted variables biases are important. In particular, in regression (1) of  
Table 5,  we start by regressing the log of imports on the log of (one plus) the preferential 
tariff rate, the first term on the right-hand side of expression (7).
  The implicit assumption in 
this specification is that the remaining terms are orthogonal to the preferential tariff rate. 
Next, in regression (2) we augment this regression with year dummies that capture the impact 
of time effects that are invariant across product codes (e.g., inflation, growth, etc.).  Both 
estimates of trade liberalization (regressions (1) and (2)) are insignificant. We obtain the 
same insignificant results in Table 6. 
 
Next, in regression (3) of  Table 5, we add dummy variables for 6-digit HS product-codes. 
This specification assumes that the impact of varieties’ prices ( ict p ) and transport costs 
( ict g ) in (7) is captured by commodity and time dummy variables (in addition to 
idiosyncratic shocks in the error term). It also posits that, controlling for goods’ dummy 
variables and time effects, the remaining variation in the price index  it P  and expenditure  it E  
is orthogonal to tariff changes. The results of this regression show that the reduction of 
                                                 
20 Since in the empirical analysis we express tariff rates in percentage terms,  ict t lg  is calculated as the log of 
(100 plus) the tariff rate.   - 13 - 
preferential tariff rates increases imports from COMESA countries. The effect is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. However, the size of the coefficient is not large relative to the 
coefficient estimated for some other countries in the existing literature (see below).
21  
 
Next, in regression (4) (Tables 5 and 6) we replace commodity dummy variables with 
commodity-by-country fixed effects. This allows us to control, for example, for time-
invariant factors that affected demand for Kenyan but not Malawian mangos, or vice versa. 
This specification controls for all time-invariant determinants of imports of commodity i 
from country c, resulting in a true fixed-effect estimation. Clausing (2001) uses a similar 
estimation strategy for imports by the United States from Canada. The estimates we find are 
now smaller in absolute value than in regression (3) but still significant at the 5% level. The 
elasticity of substitution (σ ) is estimated to equal 1.7, while the elasticity of imports with 
respect to tariff rates is between 14% and 16%. In particular, if the ad valorem tariff rate 
decreases by 100% (for example, by 10 percentage points when the tariff rate equals 10%), 
then imports from COMESA countries increase by 16% (based on column (4), Table 5). 
Based on column (4), Table 6 if the ad valorem tariff rate decreases by 10 percentage points, 
imports increase by 14%. The magnitude of these effects is relatively small, compared to the 
results from previous studies for other countries and agreements. In her analysis of U.S. trade 
imports from Canada within the CUSFTA agreement, Clausing (2001) finds that a ten 
percentage point decrease in tariffs implies a 96% increase in imports from Canada. Our 
estimate of Uganda’s elasticity of substitution is also much smaller than the estimated 
elasticity for the U.S. computed by Romalis (2005), which ranges between 6.2 and 10.9.  
 
For Mexican imports, however, Romalis finds an estimate that ranges between 0.6 and 2.5 
and is close to our own for Uganda. Our estimate is also similar in magnitude to the elasticity 
of import demand for Uganda estimated by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2005) (equal to 
1.22).
22 This may suggest that consumers in low-income countries, in general, have more 
inelastic demand curves and are, therefore, less likely to immediately benefit from trade 
reform.  Search costs may help explain the reluctance of low-income consumers to switch the 
origin of their purchases. 
 
 
B.   Difference-in-Difference Estimator 
The estimation strategy up to this point depends on several assumptions that may not hold. In 
particular, the price index  it P  and expenditure  it E  may not be orthogonal to preferential 
tariff rates, after controlling for commodity (or commodity-by-country) fixed effects and 
time effects. For example, if commodities with increased expenditure levels  it E  (and thus 
high imports) are protected against preferential tariff reductions, then our coefficient estimate 
                                                 
21 We obtain a similar result in regression (3), Table 6. 
22 The elasticity of import demand equals the elasticity of substitution, if the cross-price demand elasticity 
between goods is zero, which is the case given a utility function of the CES-Cobb Douglas form (Kee, Nicita 
and Olarreaga 2005).   - 14 - 
of  σ −  in regression (7) would be biased towards zero. Another concern is that  it P  might be 
correlated with preferential tariff movements since, by construction,  it P  is a function of all 
tariffs in the sector, including COMESA tariffs. In addition in Uganda, COMESA and MFN 
tariff rates were liberalized simultaneously resulting in a clear correlation between the 
regressor and  it P .  
 
We next modify our empirical model to address these issues by constructing a difference-in-
difference estimator, in which the control group is imports from non-COMESA countries. 
Using expression (6) for CIF imports by Uganda of variety c and of variety c′ of good i at 


































.                     (8) 
 
Let's suppose that c represents COMESA countries while c′ non-COMESA countries. The 
advantage of considering expression (8), which represents Uganda's relative imports from 
COMESA to non-COMESA countries, is that the terms in  it P  and  it E  get canceled out from 
the estimating equation. Expression (8) suggests a new specification of the empirical model. 
The dependent variable now becomes the logarithm of the ratio of imports from COMESA 
countries to imports from non-COMESA countries. We regress it on the log of the preference 
margin afforded by Uganda to preferential trading partners. We calculate the log of the 
preference margin as the difference between the log of (one plus) the preferential tariff rate 
and the log of (one plus) the MFN tariff rate. In other words, we estimate the following 



















− + − + − ⋅ − = lg ) 1 ( lg ) 1 ( ) lg (lg lg ' σ σ σ ,               (9) 
 
where c and c′ represent, respectively, the varieties coming from each COMESA member 
country and from the rest of the world (as a whole). As in regressions (4), we introduce 
commodity-by-country fixed effects and time dummy variables. Therefore, in this last 
specification we only need to assume that the time variation in relative prices and relative 
transportation costs of two varieties of the same commodity is orthogonal to tariff 
movements. 
 
In the theoretical model, we assume that the elasticity of substitution between varieties of the 
same good is equal for any pair of origin countries of imports. In practice in the empirical 
analysis, as made clear by equation (9), the elasticity of substitution we estimate is between 
COMESA and non-COMESA origin varieties, since we exploit the differential variation in 
preferential vs. MFN tariff rates. 
   - 15 - 
This regression represents our difference-in-difference (and preferred) specification. As 
mentioned above, this strategy makes it possible to net out the impact of commodity-specific 
effects which are time-varying, such as  it P  and  it E . Thus, our difference-in-difference 
estimator also allows us to net out the impact of changes in MFN tariff rates that take place 
over the same period.  
 
Results in Table 5, regression (5), suggest that the biases due to  it P  and  it E  may not have 
been substantial since our new estimate is very close to what we previously found: the 
coefficient on the log of the preference margin equals -1.9 (significant at the 10% level). In 
Table 6, regression (5), we also estimate this equation using, as independent variable, 
) ( it it MFNtariff PTAtariff − , which is the preference margin afforded by Uganda to 
preferential trading partners, calculated as the difference between the preferential tariff rate 
and the MFN tariff rate  (as before we use a first-order Taylor approximation to approximate 
t lg ). The results are similar. 
 
C.   Robustness Checks 
We next test the robustness of these results in Table 7. First, in regression (1) of Table 7, we 
expand the dataset. Some COMESA countries increased exports from zero to a positive value 
in a specific product code, or vice versa. In the former case, by excluding this variation our 
previous regression estimates would be biased toward zero. Therefore, whenever import data 
exists for at least a single year but not the other years, we add observations for the missing 
year(s), and assign them an import value of US$1. Results in column (1) suggest that the 
exclusion of these observations in Tables 5 and 6 did not bias our estimate towards zero. 
 
Second, we relax the assumption that the elasticity of substitution is constant across product 
codes and run regressions that are specific for each one-digit HS code (see appendix I and II 
for a list of two-digit codes included in each one-digit code). Estimates of the elasticity of 
substitution are insignificant for each one-digit sector except HS1, HS2, and HS3 (which 
include agricultural products and beverages). For these sectors, we estimate elasticities that 
are substantially higher than on average. Therefore, first, our previous average estimates hide 
cross-sector heterogeneity. Second, not surprisingly, the sectors where the impact is larger 
and significant are those where developing countries are more likely to have a comparative 
advantage. These results are presented in regressions (2) through (4) in Table 7. 
 






) term in equation (9) might 
be correlated with the preference margin, even after controlling for commodity (or 
commodity-by-country) fixed effects and time effects as done in regression (5), Table 5. Our 
third robustness check attempts to control for this bias, which is for example due to 
unobserved changes in the marginal cost of production of commodity i in country c (affecting 
the border price) that may be correlated with tariff movements. For example, production of 
beer in Kenya might have become more efficient relative to non-COMESA countries, and   - 16 - 
this might be negatively correlated with preferential concessions for political-economy 
reasons (e.g., the excise taxes on alcohol). This would bias our estimate towards zero. 
 
Expression (8) above refers to Uganda’s relative imports (from COMESA vs. non-COMESA 
countries). Based on the same model, we can derive a very similar expression for any other 
country’s relative imports from (the same) COMESA vs. (the same) non-COMESA 
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We then use this expression to construct our triple difference estimating equation, where the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of Uganda’s imports from COMESA countries relative to 
non-COMESA countries (expression (8)) divided by South Africa’s imports from COMESA 
countries relative to non-COMESA countries (expression (10)): 
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This specification nets out the impact of the relative border-price term, which is independent 






 appears in both equations (8) and (10) and 
gets canceled out by taking their ratio). However, as in the previous specifications, we still 
need to assume that the relative transport-costs term is given by the sum of commodity-by-
country fixed effects, time dummy variables and a random component orthogonal to the 
preference margin. 
 
This is the approach taken by Romalis (2005). The last column in Table 7 shows the results 
based on equation (11). The estimated elasticity of substitution is insignificantly different 
from zero. If this result is due to a true zero elasticity of substitution, then our previous 
estimates were not underestimating the impact of COMESA on imports; however, if the 
                                                 
23 We thank John Romalis for his suggestion to use South Africa in the triple difference specification. We 
choose South Africa since we want to maximize the number of products that both countries (Uganda and South 
Africa) import from the same origin country. These are the observations that can be used to estimate equation 
(15). The apartheid ban on exports to South Africa was lifted in 1993; therefore, the impact on changes between 
1994 and 2003 should be minimal.   - 17 - 
insignificance of the elasticity is caused by the imprecision of the estimate (e.g., due to few 
observations), then we cannot draw strong conclusions from this robustness check. In 
addition, notice that this robustness check is based on a much smaller number of observations 
than previous specifications, therefore the estimate might be affected by a selection-bias 
problem. We check this in regression (5), which delivers a coefficient estimate which is not 
statistically different from our original estimate of -1.93. 
 
D.   Trade Diversion 
Our last test is for trade diversion. This test is important to make a welfare statement about 
the impact of the trade agreement. Our investigation is based on the fact that, if trade 
diversion resulted from the PTA agreement, holding all other factors constant, we would 
expect a decline in imports from non-COMESA countries in those sectors where preferential 
tariff rates decline. Our empirical strategy relies on expression (7) above implemented for 
imports from non-COMESA countries. Results are presented in Table 8. 
 
The first column presents the results from the regression of the log of non-COMESA imports 
on the log of the MFN tariff rate. The equation includes commodity-by-country dummies and 
year effects, therefore it is equivalent to the fourth regression in Table 5 for imports from 
COMESA countries. The number of observations is over 62 thousand accounting for the 
much higher share of non-COMESA imports in total imports to Uganda. The coefficient is 
also small, significant, and is consistent with the results in Table 5. That is, the estimates for 
the elasticity of substitution between COMESA and non-COMESA countries origin goods, 
measured using data either for imports from COMESA or non-COMESA countries, are 
similar.  
 
To test for trade diversion effects, we include the log of the preferential tariff rate in 
regression (2) to capture the impact of COMESA trade liberalization on non-COMESA 
imports, which according to the model works through  it P . The coefficient on the latter 
variable is insignificantly different from zero, thus, giving no support to the trade-diversion 
hypothesis. Trade diversion, however, may only occur in sectors in which COMESA has a 
comparative advantage. In regression (3) and (4), to control for this factor, we include as 
regressors the log of COMESA imports and the COMESA share in imports, respectively, and 
their interaction with preferential tariff rates All trade diversion variables remain 
insignificant. Finally, we find additional evidence consistent with no trade diversion taking 
place in Figure 2, which shows that the ratio of imports from COMESA relative to non-
COMESA (developing) countries decreased after 1994. 
 
Therefore, although COMESA’s preferential tariff liberalization has not considerably 
increased Uganda’s trade with member countries, these small effects are likely to be 
associated with trade creation. 
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VI.   CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we present evidence that South-South trade agreements create positive but little 
economic gains, through changes in trade patterns, for their members. In particular, we find 
evidence of small increases in trade volumes in the case of Uganda within COMESA. Thus, 
commodity-level data offers a different picture of the effect of COMESA than the evidence 
based on aggregate data (see, for example, our summary statistics in Table 1 and also the 
results in Cernat (2001) based on a gravity-type analysis
24). 
 
Our estimates are similar to what Romalis (2005) finds in the case of Mexico within the 
NAFTA agreement. This may suggest that consumers in low-income countries, in general, 
have more inelastic demand curves and are, therefore, less likely to immediately benefit from 
trade reform. Search costs may help explain the reluctance of low-income consumers to 
switch the origin of their imports. An alternative explanation of our findings is the South-
South nature of the agreement. Preferential trade agreements among developing countries 
may lead to no or a small effect on trade volumes, since developing countries are not natural 
trading partners.  
 
We test the robustness of our elasticity estimates in a number of ways. One concern is that 
the reduction in tariff rates within COMESA might have been compensated by an increase of 
non-tariff barriers on the same commodities. For example, after the initial implementation of 
COMESA, ad valorem excise taxes were imposed in Uganda on selected imports and goods 
targeted for these taxes tended to be produced predominantly in COMESA countries. We 
think that this reading of our results is unlikely given that we partially account for the 
existence of non-tariff barriers by using data on import excise taxes. Political economy 
factors are also unlikely to affect our results as, in our main specification, we control for both 
time-invariant political-economy factors and changes over time of political-economy factors 
that are common across member and non-member countries. In addition, our findings are not 
overturned by a triple-difference estimation strategy that controls for the impact of factors 
that change over time and are specific for each origin country of imports (this robustness 
check follows Romalis (2005)). Finally, our results are strengthened when we consider the 
possible impact of tax evasion on recorded imports, as documented by Fisman and Wei 
(2001).  
 
The results of this paper suggest two important directions for future work. From a positive 
point of view, if the main economic gains are minimal, why do South-South agreements 
continue to increase in popularity, not only amongst politicians in the South but also amongst 
politicians in the North? One possible answer is non-economic motifs. For example, an 
important aspect of COMESA's official priorities is the promotion of peace and security in 
the region. This goal is consistent with recent work in the literature by Martin, Mayer and 
Thoenig (2005) who show that regional trade agreements can reduce the probability of war 
                                                 
24 However, as pointed out in the literature survey, the evidence on South-South African PTAs based on 
gravity-type analyses of aggregate data is mixed (Cernat 2001, Subramanian and Tamirisa 2001).   - 19 - 
between liberalizing countries, while multilateral liberalization can potentially increase it. 
However, from a normative point of view, given the limited capacity of institutions in the 
South, are resources efficiently spent in the negotiation and implementation of South-South 
regional trade agreements? The answers to these questions are clearly not resolved in this 
paper. 
 







Figure 1. Uganda: Imports and Tariff Revenue (percent of GDP), 1986 - 2003
Source: Ugandan Authorities, DOTS (IMF), and IFS (IMF); Non-COMESA countries are only non-














































Figure 2 Uganda: Imports from Developing Countries (percent of GDP), 1986 - 2003













Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Tariff Rate for COMESA countries 1994 (percentage points) 1,204 11.3 10.0 0.0 118.0
COMESA Tariff Rate 2003 (percentage points) 1,204 5.5 7.8 0.0 136.0
Imports from COMESA countries (1994, thousand $) 1,204 155.2 1,065.9 0.5 20,262.3
Imports from COMESA countries (2003, thousand $) 1,204 289.3 5,269.1 0.5 181,275.2
The sample is resticted to commodities for which data on imports from COMESA countries is available for both 1994 and 2003. 
Tariff rates are adjusted for the existence of import excise taxes.
The tariff rate for COMESA countries in 1994 is the average tariff rate faced by COMESA countries in 1994, which uses both PTA and MFN rates.
Imports refer to a single 6-digit HS commodity. 
Preferential tariff rates are set equal to MFN tarfiff rates when no preferential rate is specified.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
MFN Tariff Rate 1994 (percentage points) 1,020 17.9 8.6 0.0 60.0
MFN Tariff Rate 2003 (percentage points) 1,020 10.2 10.2 0.0 145.0
Imports from non-COMESA (1994, thousand $) 1,020 364.6 1,289.2 0.5 18,223.9
Imports from non-COMESA (2003, thousand $) 1,020 718.4 2,381.7 0.5 30,602.1
Tariff rates are adjusted for the existence of import excise taxes.
Imports refer to a single 6-digit HS commodity. 
Table 1: Summary statistics for Uganda vis-à-vis COMESA countries (1994-2003)
Table 2: Summary statistics for Uganda vis-à-vis non-COMESA countries (1994-2003)
The sample is resticted to commodities for which data on imports from non-COMESA countries is available for both 1994 and 2003. This is a 
subset of the dataset we use, which restricts productcodes to commodities that in at least one of the years was imported from COMESA. 













PTA tariff rates COMESA tariff rates
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
Free Trade 334            6.66 6.66 Free Trade 986            20.20 20.20
Tariffs under 5 per cent 1,172         23.36 30.01 Tariffs under 5 per cent 2,035         41.70 61.91
Tariffs between 5 and 10 per cent 1,558         31.05 61.06 Tariffs between 5 and 10 per cent 1,521         31.17 93.07
Tariffs between 10 and 25 per cent 1,367         27.24 88.30 Tariffs between 10 and 25 per cent 305            6.25 99.32
Tariffs over 25 per cent 587            11.70 100.00 Tariffs over 25 per cent 33              0.68 100.00
Total 5,018         100.00 Total 4,880 100.00
Preferential tariff rates are set equal to MFN tarfiff rates when no preferential rate is specified.
Tariff rates are adjusted for the existence of import excise taxes.
MFN tariff rates MFN tariff rates
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
Free Trade 170            3.39 3.39 Free Trade 986            20.20 20.20
Tariffs under 5 per cent 11              0.22 3.61 Tariffs under 5 per cent 12              0.25 20.45
Tariffs between 5 and 10 per cent 2,268         45.20 48.80 Tariffs between 5 and 10 per cent 2,021         41.41 61.86
Tariffs between 10 and 25 per cent 1,298         25.87 74.67 Tariffs between 10 and 25 per cent 1,813         37.15 99.02
Tariffs over 25 per cent 1,271         25.33 100.00 Tariffs over 25 per cent 48              0.98 100.00
Total 5,018         100.00 Total 4,880         100.00
Tariff rates are adjusted for the existence of import excise taxes.
1994 2003
Table 3: The pattern of protection in Uganda in 1994 and 2003 under the preferential trade agreements (PTA in 1994 and COMESA in 2003)
1994 2003











Table 5: Estimates Based on Uganda Imports in 1994, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Log of preferential tariff -0.0879 0.1072 -3.1740 -1.7243
0.2859 0.3085 0.6954** 0.8017*
Log of preference margin -1.9538
1.1924+
Constant 2.4051 1.3715 16.4824 9.8462 -1.1211
1.3347 1.4364 3.2408** 3.7372** 0.0857**
Year dummy variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commodity dummy variables No No Yes No No
Commodity-country dummy variables No No No Yes Yes
Number of differences Zero Zero Zero One Two
Estimator OLS OLS OLS FE FE
Observations 10,341 10,341 10,341 10,341 10,341
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 6 00 . 7 60 . 8 1
Elasticity of substitution -0.0879 0.1072 -3.174 -1.7243 -1.9538
0.2859 0.3085 0.6954** 0.8017* 1.1924+
Log of imports




Dependent variable Log of imports Log of imports Log of imports
Commodity dummy variables are set at the 6-digit HS product-code level. Commodity-country dummy variables are for the pairwise 
combinations of commodities and import-origin countries. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The log of import equals the log of Uganda's imports from COMESA countries (1994, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003). The difference of log 
of imports: COMESA vs. non-COMESA equals the log of Uganda's relative imports from COMESA vs. non-COMESA countries 
(1994, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003). 
The log of preferential tariff equals the log of (100 plus) Uganda's tariff rate (1994, 2002, 2001, 2002, 2003).  The log preference 
margin equals the log of (100 plus) Uganda's preferential tariff rate for COMESA countries (PTA tariff rate (for PTA countries) and 
customs-duty rate (for non-PTA countries) in 1994; and COMESA tariff rate in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003) minus the log of (100 plus) 










Table 6: Estimates Based on Uganda Imports in 1994, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Preferential tariff rate 0.0010 0.0025 -0.0255 -0.0136
0.0024 0.0025 0.0069** 0.0083+
Preference margin -0.0193
0.0096*
Constant 1.9879 1.9888 2.2772 1.8901 -1.1295
0.0244** 0.0443** 0.0943** 0.0602** 0.0826**
Year dummy variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commodity dummy variables No No Yes No No
Commodity-country dummy variables No No No Yes Yes
Number of differences Zero Zero Zero One Two
Estimator OLS OLS OLS FE FE
Observations 10,341 10,341 10,341 10,341 10,341
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.76 0.81
Commodity dummy variables are set at the 6-digit HS product-code level. Commodity-country dummy variables are for the pairwise 
combinations of commodities and import-origin countries. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The log of import equals the log of Uganda's imports from COMESA countries (1994, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003). The difference of log 
of imports: COMESA vs. non-COMESA equals the log of Uganda's relative imports from COMESA vs. non-COMESA countries 
(1994, 2000
The log of preferential tariff equals the log of (100 plus) Uganda's tariff rate (1994, 2002, 2001, 2002, 2003).  The log preference 
margin equals the log of (100 plus) Uganda's preferential tariff rate for COMESA countries (PTA tariff rate (for PTA count
Log of imports














Table 7: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Including
Missing Obs. HS 1 HS 2 HS 3
Log of preference margin -0.3185 -12.0281 -8.0169 -4.4884 1.1562
1.1270 6.7830+ 3.0652** 2.1271* 6.5281
-3.2874
10.8450
Constant -5.0657 -0.0230 3.5646 0.1060 -2.1392 4.0646
0.0792** 0.6172 0.3577** 0.2060 0.6261** 0.8081**
Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commodity dummy variables No No No No No No
Commodity-country dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of differences Two Two Two Two Two Three
Estimator FE FE FE FE FE FE
Observations 21,500 470 1,090 1,357 317 317
R-squared 0.57 0.74 0.77 0.72 0.99 0.97
Elasticity of substitution -0.3185 -12.0281 -8.0169 -4.4884 1.1562 -3.2874
1.127 6.7830+ 3.0652** 2.1271* 6.5281 10.845
Broad HS codes are defined in appendix I.




Diff - in - Diff: 
COMESA vs. 
non-COMESA, 
Uganda vs. South 
Africa
Dependent variable












Commodity dummy variables are set at the 6-digit HS product-code level. Commodity-country dummy variables are for the pairwise combinations of 
commodities and import-origin countries. 
Broad Sectors Triple Diff with
South Africa
Ratio of preference margin: Uganda vs. 
South Africa
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The difference of log of imports: COMESA vs. non-COMESA equals the log of Uganda's relative imports from COMESA vs. non-COMESA countries (1994, 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003). The diff - in - diff: COMESA vs. non-COMESA, Uganda vs. South Africa equals the log of relative imports from COMESA vs. non-
COMESA countries in Uganda vs. South Africa (1994, 2001).
The log preference margin equals the log of (100 plus) Uganda's preferential tariff rate for COMESA countries (PTA tariff rate (for PTA countries) and 
customs-duty rate (for non-PTA countries) in 1994; and COMESA tariff rate in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003) minus the log of (100 plus) Uganda's customs-duty 
rate for non-COMESA countries. The ratio of preference margin: Uganda vs. South Africa is the log difference between the preference margin in Uganda and 
the preference margin in South Africa.
















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of MFN tariff -0.8052 -0.7438 -0.6540 -0.64313
0.2869** 0.3440* 0.3444+ 0.3458+








COMESA share in imports -1.1308
2.6690
Constant 5.6131 5.9363 5.7554 6.4676
1.3676** 1.6379** 1.6311** 1.7069**
Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commodity-country dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of differences One One One One
Estimator FE FE FE FE
Observations 62,302 62,302 62,302 62,302
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 7 80 . 7 80 . 7 80 . 7 8
Table 8: Estimates of Trade Diversion Based on Uganda Imports from Non-COMESA 
countries in 1994, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003
The log of import equals the log of Uganda's imports from non-COMESA countries (1994, 2000, 2001, 2002, 
2003). 
Log of preferential tariff *Log of 
COMESA imports
Log of preferential tariff *COMESA 
share
Log of imports
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Dependent variable Log of imports Log of imports Log of imports
The log of MFN tariff equals the log of (100 plus) Uganda's tariff rate (1994, 2002, 2001, 2002, 2003). The log of 
COMESA imports equals the log of Uganda's imports from COMESA countries (1994, 2002, 2001, 2002, 2003) in 
that commodity.  The COMESA share in imports equals the share of Uganda's imports from COMESA countries 
(1994, 2002, 2001, 2002, 2003) in that commodity. 
Commodity dummy variables are set at the 6-digit HS product-code level. Commodity-country dummy variables are 










% Point Change 
Preferential 
Tariff Rates
 01             LIVE ANIMALS                                                 4.67 4.00 -0.67
 02             MEAT AND EDIBLE MEAT OFFAL                           21.12 16.00 -5.12
 03             FISH, CRUSTACEANS & AQUATIC INVERTEBRA 15.34 6.00 -9.34
 04             DAIRY PRODS; BIRDS EGGS; HONEY; ED ANIMA 14.60 13.20 -1.40
 05             PRODUCTS OF ANIMAL ORIGIN, NESOI                14.41 5.88 -8.53
 06             LIVE TREES, PLANTS, BULBS ETC.; CUT FLOWE 15.38 2.67 -12.72
 07             EDIBLE VEGETABLES & CERTAIN ROOTS & TU 23.21 6.00 -17.21
 08             EDIBLE FRUIT & NUTS; CITRUS FRUIT OR MELO 24.08 6.00 -18.08
 09             COFFEE, TEA, MATE & SPICES                                 20.52 4.19 -16.33
 10             CEREALS                                                      11.22 5.13 -6.09
 11             MILLING PRODUCTS; MALT; STARCH; INULIN;  20.01 5.24 -14.77
 12             OIL SEEDS ETC.; MISC GRAIN, SEED, FRUIT, PLA 10.00 3.84 -6.16
 13             LAC; GUMS, RESINS & OTHER VEGETABLE SAP 8.00 4.00 -4.00
 14             VEGETABLE PLAITING MATERIALS & PRODUC 22.18 4.00 -18.18
 15             ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE FATS, OILS ETC. & WA 6.67 6.51 -0.17
 16             EDIBLE PREPARATIONS OF MEAT, FISH, CRUST 19.68 6.00 -13.68
 17             SUGARS AND SUGAR CONFECTIONARY              12.67 11.73 -0.93
 18             COCOA AND COCOA PREPARATIONS                    23.18 6.00 -17.18
 19             PREP CEREAL, FLOUR, STARCH OR MILK; BAKE 15.00 8.50 -6.50
 20             PREP VEGETABLES, FRUIT, NUTS OR OTHER PL 15.34 9.95 -5.39
 21             MISCELLANEOUS EDIBLE PREPARATIONS          18.00 9.33 -8.67
 22             BEVERAGES, SPIRITS AND VINEGAR                    55.90 62.67 6.76
 23             FOOD INDUSTRY RESIDUES & WASTE; PREP AN 5.88 5.83 -0.05
 24             TOBACCO AND MANUFACTURED TOBACCO SU 55.00 96.00 41.00
 25             SALT; SULFUR; EARTH & STONE; LIME & CEME 6.96 4.64 -2.32
 26             ORES, SLAG AND ASH                                           8.35 3.76 -4.59
 27             MINERAL FUEL, OIL ETC.; BITUMIN SUBST; MIN 6.72 4.34 -2.38
 28             INORG CHEM; PREC & RARE-EARTH MET & RA 9.01 2.87 -6.14
 29             ORGANIC CHEMICALS                                            8.24 3.25 -4.98
 30             PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS                              0.00 0.00 0.00
 31             FERTILIZERS                                                  0.00 0.00 0.00
 32             TANNING & DYE EXT ETC; DYE, PAINT, PUTTY 8.80 3.16 -5.65
 33             ESSENTIAL OILS ETC; PERFUMERY, COSMETIC 35.15 14.43 -20.72
 34             SOAP ETC; WAXES, POLISH ETC; CANDLES; DEN 17.55 7.39 -10.15
 35             ALBUMINOIDAL SUBST; MODIFIED STARCH; G 8.38 2.46 -5.92
 36             EXPLOSIVES; PYROTECHNICS; MATCHES; PYR 18.63 6.00 -12.63
 37             PHOTOGRAPHIC OR CINEMATOGRAPHIC GOOD 22.42 5.03 -17.39
 38             MISCELLANEOUS CHEMICAL PRODUCTS            7.07 2.83 -4.25
 39             PLASTICS AND ARTICLES THEREOF                      6.43 5.21 -1.21
 40             RUBBER AND ARTICLES THEREOF                        7.19 3.98 -3.21
 41             RAW HIDES AND SKINS (NO FURSKINS) AND LE 10.68 4.00 -6.68
 42             LEATHER ART; SADDLERY ETC; HANDBAGS ET 13.59 6.00 -7.59
 43             FURSKINS AND ARTIFICIAL FUR; MANUFACTU 18.33 5.71 -12.62
 44             WOOD AND ARTICLES OF WOOD; WOOD CHAR 14.15 9.90 -4.25
 45             CORK AND ARTICLES OF CORK                              12.00 6.00 -6.00
 46             MFR OF STRAW, ESPARTO ETC.; BASKETWARE 10.00 6.00 -4.00
Uganda's preferential tariff rates by 2-digit 1996 HS codes, 1994 and 2003  - 28 -  APPENDIX I 
 






% Point Change 
Preferential 
Tariff Rates
 47             WOOD PULP ETC; RECOVD (WASTE & SCRAP) P 1.84 3.37 1.53
 48             PAPER & PAPERBOARD & ARTICLES (INC PAPR 7.27 4.94 -2.33
 49             PRINTED BOOKS, NEWSPAPERS ETC; MANUSCR 5.42 2.32 -3.11
 50             SILK, INCLUDING YARNS AND WOVEN FABRIC 12.80 6.00 -6.80
 51             WOOL & ANIMAL HAIR, INCLUDING YARN & W 13.25 5.94 -7.31
 52             COTTON, INCLUDING YARN AND WOVEN FABR 19.09 7.57 -11.52
 53             VEG TEXT FIB NESOI; VEG FIB & PAPER YNS & 11.87 5.86 -6.01
 54             MANMADE FILAMENTS, INCLUDING YARNS &  11.02 10.06 -0.95
 55             MANMADE STAPLE FIBERS, INCL YARNS & WO 12.43 6.09 -6.35
 56             WADDING, FELT ETC; SP YARN; TWINE, ROPES 14.52 4.23 -10.29
 57             CARPETS AND OTHER TEXTILE FLOOR COVER 20.87 6.00 -14.87
 58             SPEC WOV FABRICS; TUFTED FAB; LACE; TAPE 17.56 6.00 -11.56
 59             IMPREGNATED ETC TEXT FABRICS; TEX ART F 9.92 5.75 -4.17
 60             KNITTED OR CROCHETED FABRICS                      15.00 5.88 -9.12
 61             APPAREL ARTICLES AND ACCESSORIES, KNIT  18.38 6.00 -12.38
 62             APPAREL ARTICLES AND ACCESSORIES, NOT K 15.04 6.00 -9.04
 63             TEXTILE ART NESOI; NEEDLECRAFT SETS; WO 14.66 6.81 -7.84
 64             FOOTWEAR, GAITERS ETC. AND PARTS THERE 15.00 5.86 -9.14
 65             HEADGEAR AND PARTS THEREOF                         20.45 6.00 -14.45
 66             UMBRELLAS, WALKING-STICKS, RIDING-CROP 23.57 6.00 -17.57
 67             PREP FEATHERS, DOWN ETC; ARTIF FLOWERS; 30.00 6.50 -23.50
 68             ART OF STONE, PLASTER, CEMENT, ASBESTOS 13.26 5.83 -7.43
 69             CERAMIC PRODUCTS                                             8.93 5.57 -3.36
 70             GLASS AND GLASSWARE                                         12.36 5.37 -6.99
 71             NAT ETC PEARLS, PREC ETC STONES, PR MET E 20.13 5.77 -14.36
 72             IRON AND STEEL                                               6.01 4.11 -1.90
 73             ARTICLES OF IRON OR STEEL                                 12.42 3.88 -8.53
 74             COPPER AND ARTICLES THEREOF                         12.07 4.00 -8.07
 75             NICKEL AND ARTICLES THEREOF                          10.31 4.50 -5.81
 76             ALUMINUM AND ARTICLES THEREOF                  5.71 4.03 -1.68
 78             LEAD AND ARTICLES THEREOF                              8.50 3.60 -4.90
 79             ZINC AND ARTICLES THEREOF                               8.18 3.20 -4.98
 80             TIN AND ARTICLES THEREOF                                 7.44 3.00 -4.44
 81             BASE METALS NESOI; CERMETS; ARTICLES TH 10.00 3.96 -6.04
 82             TOOLS, CUTLERY ETC. OF BASE METAL & PAR 11.28 4.00 -7.28
 83             MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES OF BASE METAL    11.40 5.28 -6.12
 84             NUCLEAR REACTORS, BOILERS, MACHINERY E 4.89 0.44 -4.45
 85             ELECTRIC MACHINERY ETC; SOUND EQUIP; TV 10.83 3.45 -7.38
 86             RAILWAY OR TRAMWAY STOCK ETC; TRAFFIC 2.58 0.00 -2.58
 87             VEHICLES, EXCEPT RAILWAY OR TRAMWAY, A 10.12 5.32 -4.80
 88             AIRCRAFT, SPACECRAFT, AND PARTS THEREO 10.00 0.53 -9.47
 89             SHIPS, BOATS AND FLOATING STRUCTURES      14.18 1.29 -12.88
 90             OPTIC, PHOTO ETC, MEDIC OR SURGICAL INST 10.19 1.21 -8.98
 91             CLOCKS AND WATCHES AND PARTS THEREOF 23.05 6.00 -17.05
 92             MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS; PARTS AND ACCESSO 30.00 4.00 -26.00
 93             ARMS AND AMMUNITION; PARTS AND ACCESS 9.41 4.00 -5.41
 94             FURNITURE; BEDDING ETC; LAMPS NESOI ETC 11.16 6.75 -4.41
 95             TOYS, GAMES & SPORT EQUIPMENT; PARTS &  14.67 5.77 -8.91
 96             MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURED ARTICLES  20.84 5.02 -15.82
 97             WORKS OF ART, COLLECTORS' PIECES AND AN 7.14 6.00 -1.14








Change MFN Tariff 
Rates
 01             LIVE ANIMALS                                                 6.67 7.00 0.33
 02             MEAT AND EDIBLE MEAT OFFAL                                   30.00 25.00 -5.00
 03             FISH, CRUSTACEANS & AQUATIC INVERTEBRATES                    30.00 15.00 -15.00
 04             DAIRY PRODS; BIRDS EGGS; HONEY; ED ANIMAL PR NESOI           22.80 22.20 -0.60
 05             PRODUCTS OF ANIMAL ORIGIN, NESOI                             15.88 13.29 -2.59
 06             LIVE TREES, PLANTS, BULBS ETC.; CUT FLOWERS ETC.             17.69 4.67 -13.03
 07             EDIBLE VEGETABLES & CERTAIN ROOTS & TUBERS                   30.00 15.00 -15.00
 08             EDIBLE FRUIT & NUTS; CITRUS FRUIT OR MELON PEEL              20.00 15.00 -5.00
 09             COFFEE, TEA, MATE & SPICES                                   25.15 7.09 -18.06
 10             CEREALS                                                      14.06 9.44 -4.63
 11             MILLING PRODUCTS; MALT; STARCH; INULIN; WHT GLUTEN           28.82 11.86 -16.96
 12             OIL SEEDS ETC.; MISC GRAIN, SEED, FRUIT, PLANT ETC           19.32 6.73 -12.59
 13             LAC; GUMS, RESINS & OTHER VEGETABLE SAP & EXTRACT            21.67 7.00 -14.67
 14             VEGETABLE PLAITING MATERIALS & PRODUCTS NESOI                28.18 6.63 -21.56
 15             ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE FATS, OILS ETC. & WAXES                  22.88 11.68 -11.21
 16             EDIBLE PREPARATIONS OF MEAT, FISH, CRUSTACEANS ETC           30.00 15.00 -15.00
 17             SUGARS AND SUGAR CONFECTIONARY                               22.00 17.93 -4.07
 18             COCOA AND COCOA PREPARATIONS                                 30.00 15.00 -15.00
 19             PREP CEREAL, FLOUR, STARCH OR MILK; BAKERS WARES             26.25 17.50 -8.75
 20             PREP VEGETABLES, FRUIT, NUTS OR OTHER PLANT PARTS            30.00 18.95 -11.05
 21             MISCELLANEOUS EDIBLE PREPARATIONS                            26.00 14.93 -11.07
 22             BEVERAGES, SPIRITS AND VINEGAR                               29.05 71.67 42.62
 23             FOOD INDUSTRY RESIDUES & WASTE; PREP ANIMAL FEED             10.00 14.30 4.30
 24             TOBACCO AND MANUFACTURED TOBACCO SUBSTITUTES                 50.00 105.00 55.00
 25             SALT; SULFUR; EARTH & STONE; LIME & CEMENT PLASTER           14.29 8.68 -5.61
 26             ORES, SLAG AND ASH                                           10.00 6.59 -3.41
 27             MINERAL FUEL, OIL ETC.; BITUMIN SUBST; MINERAL WAX           10.45 9.10 -1.35
 28             INORG CHEM; PREC & RARE-EARTH MET & RADIOACT COMPD           10.00 5.03 -4.97
 29             ORGANIC CHEMICALS                                            9.80 5.69 -4.10
 30             PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS                                      0.00 0.00 0.00
 31             FERTILIZERS                                                  0.00 0.00 0.00
 32             TANNING & DYE EXT ETC; DYE, PAINT, PUTTY ETC; INKS           15.43 6.26 -9.18
 33             ESSENTIAL OILS ETC; PERFUMERY, COSMETIC ETC PREPS            28.53 22.58 -5.95
 34             SOAP ETC; WAXES, POLISH ETC; CANDLES; DENTAL PREPS           24.85 13.52 -11.33
 35             ALBUMINOIDAL SUBST; MODIFIED STARCH; GLUE; ENZYMES           11.54 4.31 -7.23
 36             EXPLOSIVES; PYROTECHNICS; MATCHES; PYRO ALLOYS ETC           21.25 15.00 -6.25
 37             PHOTOGRAPHIC OR CINEMATOGRAPHIC GOODS                        23.89 12.40 -11.49
 38             MISCELLANEOUS CHEMICAL PRODUCTS                              10.18 4.94 -5.23
 39             PLASTICS AND ARTICLES THEREOF                                12.17 9.60 -2.57
 40             RUBBER AND ARTICLES THEREOF                                  13.56 6.92 -6.64
 41             RAW HIDES AND SKINS (NO FURSKINS) AND LEATHER                30.00 7.00 -23.00
 42             LEATHER ART; SADDLERY ETC; HANDBAGS ETC; GUT ART             26.36 15.00 -11.36
 43             FURSKINS AND ARTIFICIAL FUR; MANUFACTURES THEREOF            18.33 13.86 -4.48
 44             WOOD AND ARTICLES OF WOOD; WOOD CHARCOAL                     28.38 17.29 -11.10
 45             CORK AND ARTICLES OF CORK                                    12.86 15.00 2.14








Change MFN Tariff 
Rates
 46             MFR OF STRAW, ESPARTO ETC.; BASKETWARE & WICKERWRK           28.33 15.00 -13.33
 47             WOOD PULP ETC; RECOVD (WASTE & SCRAP) PPR & PPRBD            12.11 5.89 -6.21
 48             PAPER & PAPERBOARD & ARTICLES (INC PAPR PULP ARTL)           15.05 9.21 -5.83
 49             PRINTED BOOKS, NEWSPAPERS ETC; MANUSCRIPTS ETC               8.42 4.05 -4.37
 50             SILK, INCLUDING YARNS AND WOVEN FABRIC THEREOF               13.00 15.00 2.00
 51             WOOL & ANIMAL HAIR, INCLUDING YARN & WOVEN FABRIC            13.06 14.78 1.72
 52             COTTON, INCLUDING YARN AND WOVEN FABRIC THEREOF              21.34 14.21 -7.13
 53             VEG TEXT FIB NESOI; VEG FIB & PAPER YNS & WOV FAB            12.26 14.45 2.19
 54             MANMADE FILAMENTS, INCLUDING YARNS & WOVEN FABRICS           14.77 16.08 1.32
 55             MANMADE STAPLE FIBERS, INCL YARNS & WOVEN FABRICS            15.91 10.13 -5.78
 56             WADDING, FELT ETC; SP YARN; TWINE, ROPES ETC.                24.81 8.27 -16.55
 57             CARPETS AND OTHER TEXTILE FLOOR COVERINGS                    30.00 15.00 -15.00
 58             SPEC WOV FABRICS; TUFTED FAB; LACE; TAPESTRIES ETC           20.37 15.00 -5.37
 59             IMPREGNATED ETC TEXT FABRICS; TEX ART FOR INDUSTRY           17.20 14.00 -3.20
 60             KNITTED OR CROCHETED FABRICS                                 30.00 14.53 -15.47
 61             APPAREL ARTICLES AND ACCESSORIES, KNIT OR CROCHET            20.00 15.00 -5.00
 62             APPAREL ARTICLES AND ACCESSORIES, NOT KNIT ETC.              20.00 15.00 -5.00
 63             TEXTILE ART NESOI; NEEDLECRAFT SETS; WORN TEXT ART           19.48 15.04 -4.45
 64             FOOTWEAR, GAITERS ETC. AND PARTS THEREOF                     30.00 14.45 -15.55
 65             HEADGEAR AND PARTS THEREOF                                   30.00 15.00 -15.00
 66             UMBRELLAS, WALKING-STICKS, RIDING-CROPS ETC, PARTS           30.00 15.00 -15.00
 67             PREP FEATHERS, DOWN ETC; ARTIF FLOWERS; H HAIR ART           30.00 15.50 -14.50
 68             ART OF STONE, PLASTER, CEMENT, ASBESTOS, MICA ETC.           21.79 14.33 -7.46
 69             CERAMIC PRODUCTS                                             22.50 13.93 -8.57
 70             GLASS AND GLASSWARE                                          17.98 12.95 -5.04
 71             NAT ETC PEARLS, PREC ETC STONES, PR MET ETC; COIN            21.47 14.42 -7.05
 72             IRON AND STEEL                                               11.96 7.07 -4.89
 73             ARTICLES OF IRON OR STEEL                                    17.64 6.65 -10.98
 74             COPPER AND ARTICLES THEREOF                                  12.07 7.00 -5.07
 75             NICKEL AND ARTICLES THEREOF                                  10.31 9.00 -1.31
 76             ALUMINUM AND ARTICLES THEREOF                                15.88 7.65 -8.24
 78             LEAD AND ARTICLES THEREOF                                    12.00 6.30 -5.70
 79             ZINC AND ARTICLES THEREOF                                    12.73 5.60 -7.13
 80             TIN AND ARTICLES THEREOF                                     12.22 5.25 -6.97
 81             BASE METALS NESOI; CERMETS; ARTICLES THEREOF                 10.00 6.94 -3.06
 82             TOOLS, CUTLERY ETC. OF BASE METAL & PARTS THEREOF            20.62 7.00 -13.62
 83             MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES OF BASE METAL                         20.00 12.11 -7.89
 84             NUCLEAR REACTORS, BOILERS, MACHINERY ETC.; PARTS             11.31 0.77 -10.54
 85             ELECTRIC MACHINERY ETC; SOUND EQUIP; TV EQUIP; PTS           18.58 6.67 -11.91
 86             RAILWAY OR TRAMWAY STOCK ETC; TRAFFIC SIGNAL EQUIP           10.00 0.00 -10.00
 87             VEHICLES, EXCEPT RAILWAY OR TRAMWAY, AND PARTS ETC           15.83 10.24 -5.60
 88             AIRCRAFT, SPACECRAFT, AND PARTS THEREOF                      10.00 0.93 -9.07
 89             SHIPS, BOATS AND FLOATING STRUCTURES                         17.35 3.06 -14.29
 90             OPTIC, PHOTO ETC, MEDIC OR SURGICAL INSTRMENTS ETC           12.14 2.39 -9.74
 91             CLOCKS AND WATCHES AND PARTS THEREOF                         29.45 15.00 -14.45
 92             MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS; PARTS AND ACCESSORIES THEREOF           30.00 7.00 -23.00
 93             ARMS AND AMMUNITION; PARTS AND ACCESSORIES THEREOF           9.41 7.00 -2.41
 94             FURNITURE; BEDDING ETC; LAMPS NESOI ETC; PREFAB BD           24.86 15.17 -9.70
 95             TOYS, GAMES & SPORT EQUIPMENT; PARTS & ACCESSORIES           20.23 14.07 -6.16
 96             MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURED ARTICLES                          27.25 11.08 -16.17
 97             WORKS OF ART, COLLECTORS' PIECES AND ANTIQUES                10.00 15.00 5.00





1 Burundi 176.68 53 25.44 107
1 Dem.Rp.Congo 1,140.56 39 298.98 58
1 Djibouti 2,787.93 26 0.00 134
1 Egypt 951.83 40 6,413.00 30
1 Eritrea 0.00 136 84.62 84
1 Ethiopia 521.70 44 53.58 95
1 Kenya 186,784.85 1 357,194.21 1
1 Madagascar 0.00 136 1.99 129
1 Malawi 890.89 41 300.13 57
1 Mauritius 1,175.95 36 2,479.16 37
1 Namibia 0.00 136 200.91 64
1 Rwanda 74.46 66 534.14 53
1 Sudan 28.25 85 10.08 117
1 Swaziland 0.00 136 9,999.18 23
1 Zambia 1,831.85 31 210.10 63
1 Zimbabwe 2,217.92 28 848.67 49
0 Afghanistan 0.00 136 93.52 82
0 Algeria 1.67 126 149.21 71
0 Andorra 0.00 136 29.44 105
0 Antigua,Barb 1.15 132 1,071.14 46
0 Argentina 48.46 71 2,190.64 38
0 Aruba 0.00 136 3.20 125
0 Asia Othr.ns 1,161.79 37 2,512.74 36
0 Australia 370.95 47 31,973.42 11
0 Austria 4,566.90 21 1,647.10 43
0 Azerbaijan 0.00 136 14.35 114
0 Bahrain 81.28 64 178.39 67
0 Bangladesh 7,429.17 18 802.76 50
0 Barbados 77.93 65 0.00 134
0 Belarus 0.00 136 4.95 122
0 Belgium 0.00 136 23,047.56 14
0 Belgium-Lux 15,338.12 10 0.00 134
0 Belize 34.61 79 47.66 97
0 Benin 20.47 88 0.00 134
0 Botswana 0.00 136 123.76 74
0 Br.Ind.Oc.Tr 13.23 98 0.00 134
0 Br.Virgin Is 6.73 110 5.94 120
0 Brazil 1,804.00 32 3,111.65 34
0 Bulgaria 159.07 54 29.01 106
0 Burkina Faso 29.40 82 0.80 132
0 Cambodia 1.63 127 1.50 131
0 Cameroon 18.38 94 34.23 102
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0 Cayman Is 1.52 129 0.00 134
0 Chad 18.82 92 0.00 134
0 Chile 0.56 134 18.02 112
0 China 9,196.41 15 70,188.67 8
0 Colombia 31.63 80 7.34 118
0 Congo 26.70 87 443.58 55
0 Cote Divoire 38.81 77 150.14 70
0 Cuba 0.00 136 2.68 126
0 Cyprus 317.89 48 74.21 85
0 Czech Rep 20.17 89 695.19 52
0 Denmark 13,662.48 12 10,953.22 21
0 Dominica 18.99 91 98.76 79
0 Dominican Rp 1.26 130 0.00 134
0 East Timor 82.55 63 0.00 134
0 Ecuador 2.97 118 2.57 127
0 Estonia 0.00 136 46.04 98
0 Finland 742.60 42 1,909.34 40
0 Fr.Guiana 4.03 113 0.00 134
0 Fr.Polynesia 456.82 45 0.00 134
0 France+Monac 11,508.95 13 15,643.87 18
0 Gambia 0.00 136 53.55 96
0 Georgia 0.00 136 100.50 77
0 Germany 31,290.16 6 39,085.10 10
0 Ghana 2.22 121 53.61 94
0 Gibraltar 18.66 93 0.00 134
0 Greece 6.29 111 440.78 56
0 Grenada 90.53 61 20.16 109
0 Guinea 48.77 70 32.14 104
0 Guyana 0.00 136 25.00 108
0 Honduras 65.81 67 17.27 113
0 Hong Kong 15,863.72 9 16,789.43 16
0 Hungary 297.21 49 888.48 48
0 Iceland 144.33 55 714.26 51
0 India 46,783.64 4 102,079.14 2
0 Indonesia 1,475.70 34 4,684.74 31
0 Iran-Islam.R 89.34 62 1,877.86 41
0 Ireland 2,470.53 27 3,625.53 33
0 Israel 2,102.33 29 4,027.72 32
0 Italy 22,485.03 8 23,286.53 13
0 Jamaica 14.70 97 97.07 80
0 Japan 57,643.46 3 90,320.65 4
0 Jordan 442.76 46 132.96 73
0 Kazakhstan 0.00 136 1,259.95 44
0 Kiribati 42.45 74 0.00 134
Uganda's imports by country of origin, 1994 and 2003 (cont.)









0 Korea D P Rp 1,151.19 38 96.10 81
0 Korea Rep. 3,376.00 22 6,947.52 28
0 Kuwait 114.70 57 2,130.10 39
0 Lebanon 46.59 72 64.18 90
0 Lesotho 0.00 136 11.10 116
0 Libya 0.00 136 5.59 121
0 Luxemberg 0.00 136 1.77 130
0 Malaysia 1,784.65 33 42,055.07 9
0 Mali 0.52 135 40.71 101
0 Malta 10.96 103 46.00 99
0 Mauritania 15.03 95 0.00 134
0 Mexico 5.71 112 165.78 68
0 Montserrat 3.32 116 18.09 111
0 Morocco 2.11 122 64.31 89
0 Mozambique 12.75 100 235.34 61
0 Myanmar 28.21 86 0.00 134
0 N.Mariana Is 1.72 124 0.00 134
0 Nauru 65.54 68 0.00 134
0 Nepal 3.77 115 0.00 134
0 Neth.Antiles 291.44 50 98.87 78
0 Netherlands 9,576.52 14 24,978.35 12
0 Neutral Zone 6.84 109 0.00 134
0 New Calednia 104.87 58 0.00 134
0 New Zealand 95.87 60 261.00 60
0 Nicaragua 0.00 136 2.40 128
0 Niger 1.68 125 60.77 91
0 Nigeria 19.85 90 482.06 54
0 Niue 8.92 105 0.00 134
0 Norway,Sb,JM 534.43 43 1,029.62 47
0 Oman 39.89 76 284.47 59
0 Pakistan 3,359.62 23 18,277.27 15
0 Palau 8.04 108 0.00 134
0 Panama 0.00 136 32.43 103
0 Papua N.Guin 0.00 136 4.00 124
0 Philippines 8.86 106 117.51 75
0 Pitcairn 0.00 136 64.36 88
0 Poland 221.52 51 188.65 65
0 Portugal 30.46 81 187.95 66
0 Qatar 11.84 102 154.85 69
0 Rep.Moldova 0.00 136 88.49 83
0 Reunion 13.22 99 0.00 134
0 Romania 2.86 119 67.68 87
0 Russian Fed 29.21 83 3,108.98 35
imports, 2003 
(thousand $)
Uganda's imports by country of origin, 1994 and 2003 (cont.)
 (based on data at the commodity level)
imports, 1994 






0 South Africa 6,488.50 20 98,907.77 3
0 Saudi Arabia 1,222.27 35 12,258.02 19
0 Senegal 1.60 128 69.99 86
0 Sierra Leone 0.85 133 18.35 110
0 Singapore 8,091.33 17 11,360.32 20
0 Slovakia 0.00 136 145.80 72
0 Slovenia 0.00 136 55.32 93
0 Somalia 104.03 59 0.00 134
0 Spain 3,029.99 25 15,880.01 17
0 Sri Lanka 0.00 136 232.80 62
0 St.Helena 0.00 136 6.99 119
0 Suriname 28.55 84 0.64 133
0 Sweden 3,275.89 24 8,786.20 24
0 Switz.Liecht 6,598.45 19 7,028.06 27
0 Syrian A.R. 44.27 73 100.72 76
0 Tanzania 8,992.63 16 10,783.41 22
0 Thailand 1,915.47 30 8,751.30 25
0 Togo 40.33 75 0.00 134
0 Tokelau 8.70 107 4.19 123
0 Tonga 9.43 104 0.00 134
0 Trinidad Tbg 3.98 114 0.00 134
0 Tunisia 14.86 96 12.29 115
0 Turkey 0.00 136 1,820.40 42
0 Turks,Caicos 1.88 123 0.00 134
0 Tuvalu 60.34 69 0.00 134
0 Ukraine 178.48 52 1,098.00 45
0 Untd Arab Em 35,383.55 5 80,295.46 6
0 Untd.Kingdom 91,131.10 2 86,318.43 5
0 USA,PR,USVI 30,373.51 7 78,040.89 7
0 Venezuela 141.84 56 60.17 92
0 Viet Nam 3.30 117 6,475.54 29
0 Wallis Fut.I 12.21 101 0.00 134
0 Westn.Sahara 1.20 131 0.00 134
0 Yemen 35.63 78 42.64 100
0 Yugoslavia 2.39 120 0.00 134
Uganda's imports by country of origin, 1994 and 2003 (cont.)
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